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On Lindhal's Theory of Distribution
§ 1. Introduction :
Ever since Kaldor's seminal work on 'Alternative 
Theories of Distribution' (Kaldor, 1955) it has become 
customary to dichotomize research results - theoretical 
and empirical - in functional income distribution in terms 
of Neo-Classical vs. Neo-Keynesian (the latter also referr­
ed to as Kaldor-Pasinetti ; Post-Keynesian - even, at times, 
Neo-Ricardian) with appropriate footnotes referring to 
fringe theories ('degree of monopoly', Marxian, etc.) and 
distinguished predecessors (Boulding, Schneider, Hahn, etc.)1 
Indeed, in two stimulating articles recently published in 
this Journal (Brems, 1979) and Darity Jr. (1981) the under­
lying theme is in terms of variations on the above dichotomy.
It is, however, extremely surprising that Erik Lindahl's 
masterly contribution to this subject has been totally ignored. 
In what has now become a classic, as a precursor of General 
Equilibrium Dynamics, and the method of Temporary Equilibrium, 
the second, 'macroeconomic' part of Studies in the Theory of 
Money and Capital (Lindhal, 1939), contains, in a nutshell, 
the whole Neo-Keynesian theory of distributive shares (whether 
of the Kaldor version in terms of different types of income 
or of the Pasinetti version in terms of classes of people), as 
a special case with the complete version, using some dubious 
Austrian Capital Theory concepts, very much akin to the 
Robinsonian model of distribution (Robinson, 1956, 1962 ; cf. 
also Ferguson (1969) § 15.3.3. and Appendix to Chapter 15).
In this paper we attempt to substantiate these remarks 
by developing a simple model with well known concepts and 
references to the above work by Lindhal. Thus, in § 2, Lindahl's 
discussion is summarized. In § 3, a simple algebraic formulation
1. For example, Ferguson (1969) :
"So far as I can determine, the first 'alternative' theories 
of distribution based upon aggregate danand are attributable 





























































































of the model is proposed - but no explicit dynamics. We 
conclude, in § 4, with remarks on the relationship of the 
Lindahlian model to other strands in macro distribution 
theory and with some tentative observations for a reorient­
ation of strategies in macroeconomic modelling suggested 
by Lindahl's work.
§ 2 . Lindahl on 'The Adjustment of Saving to Investment' :
It must, at the very outset, be pointed out that 
from the point of view of the virtues of the History of 
Economic Thought we should refer to Lindhal (1924) and 
Lindahl (1930) - particularly to the latter publication : 
Penningpolitikens Medel 1 2. The discussions pertaining to 
the possibility of savings being brought to equality with 
investment by variations in the distribution of income are 
spelled out in great detail in Penningpolitikens Medel, 
and with particular emphasis. Much of this is abridged, 
and emphasized parts deleted or simply stated in the much
2too concise version in Part II of the English 'translation' .
However, since we expect that most of the interested 
readers will not be very proficient in Swedish - and, in 
any case, the two Swedish volumes are relatively inaccess­
ible - or, in any of the other related Scandinavian languages,
1. The preface to this book was signed by Lindahl in November 1929, and 
hence, is almost contemporaneous with Keynes (1930) and the "Widow's 
Cruse" parable which motivated Kaldor (but cf. Kaldor, 1978, p. ix., 
f.n. 1). Here, of course, the Wicksell link is clear (cf. also 
Wicksell, 1925, p. 216, f.n. 1, esp. the last two sentences and 
Wicksell (1898), esp. the end of chapter 9). But, of course, the idea 
really goes back to Ricardo's discussion of the high price of bullion 
cf. Ricardo's Appendix to The High Price of Bullion, published first 
in The Edinburgh Review, 1811, reprinted in Ricardo (1951) , p. 99-127, 
esp. pp. 120-122.
2. For example, the crucial passage in the English version of Lindahl 
(1939) onp. 174 has an equivalent to the Swedish version to Lindhal 
(1930) p. 41. The reference tQ the mechanism of variations to the 
distribution of income leading to the savtogs-tovestment equality is 
to italics to the Swedish version (F03RSKJUTNING AV INKQMSTFORDELNINGEN) 




























































































the references will only be to Lindahl (1939). It must 
not, however, be forgotten that for a complete and proper 
appreciation one must return to the Swedish original.
Lindahl poses the question of how savings will be 
brought to equilibrium with a higher level of investment, 
from an initial equilibrium situation, due to a lowering 
of the rate of interest which leads to 'increase in stocks' 
and (in a characteristically Austrian way) a 'reorientation 
of production in a more capitalistic direction (italics 
added, Lindahl 1939, p. 169). Thus, the seemingly paradox­
ical question is :
"How can a lowering of the loan rate of interest 
which is generally supposed to have a tendency to 
decrease (voluntary) saving, thus cause an increase 
in total saving ?"
(Lindahl, op. cit., p. 174)
Dismissing answers in terms of so-called 'forced 
saving' doctrines he goes on to make, what today would be 
characterized as a Neo-Keynesian or Kaldor-Pasinetti, the 
proposition that :
"The solution appears to be, that while a lowering 
of the interest level might possibly diminish the 
propensity to save if the distribution of income 
were unaltered, it occasions a redistribution of 
incomes such that those with a relatively strong 
disposition to save find their incomes increased, 
at the expense of those whose disposition to do so 
is relatively weak".
(Lindahl, op. cit., p. 174)
Lindahl concludes this particular section with the final 
remark that :
"The required saving will then take place voluntarily 
in greater part £i.e., not by means of the mechanism 




























































































rather be the alteration in the distribution of income
due to the shift in the price level".
(Lindahl, op. cit., p. 175)
In these two remarkable sections Lindahl proposes an 
original - for the period in question - approach to distrib­
ution - an approach almost validating Kaldor's remark to 
Hahn (cf. Hahn, 1973).
At a more formal level, Lindahl's model is very 
similar to the Robinsonian model of distribution with one 
important qualification (cf. below p. 6). Lindahl analyses 
the problem of the well known Wicksellian cumulative process 
under various alternative assumptions. The section of interest 
to us is characterized by the following assumptions :
a) The Economy is closed and in stationary (or steady) 
state.
b) Monetary Policy is autonomous.
c) There are two produced commodities :
i) a consumption good 
and ii) a capital good
d) There are three classes :
i) Workers
ii) Capitalists (Rentiers in Mrs. Robinson's 
model)
iii) Entrepreneurs (Capitalists in the Neo- 
Keynesian sense)
e) Two types of income : Wages and Profits
f) Full employment of all factors
g) No explicit role for a government
h) Given money wage rate
i) Given, constant, savings propensities of the three 
classes from the two types of income ; there is a 
clear indication that the savings propensities of 
the entrepreneurs are greater than those of the 
capitalists, and the latter's greater than the 
workers.




























































































It is not clear whether workers' savings propensity out 
of wage income is identical to those from profit income.
Under the assumptions stated above, Lindahl invest­
igates the problem of the consequences to the cumulative 
process of a lowering of the rate of interest by the 
autonomous monetary authority ; and, as a by-product, 
stumbles on to the Neo-Keynesian or Kaldor-Pasinetti 
theory of functional income distribution.
There is, however, one crucial difference between 
Lindahl and 'mainstream' Kaldor-Pasinetti. That is the 
reliance on some features of a characteristically Austrian 
approach to the problem of investment in capital goods - 
and this is the point at which the similarity to Mrs. 
Robinson's model gets closest, and yet remains very 
different. It is not surprising that this similarity is 
in terms of the concept of 'more capitalistic' in terms 
of lower interest rates ; for, in Mrs. Robinson's model the 
corresponding concept was 'the degree of mechanization' in 
relation to the real-capital ratio which was defined in 
terms of the (notional) rate of interest. We read Chapter 
VI of Lindahl (1939) and numerous post-Sraffa articles by 
Joan Robinson (cf. in particular Robinson, 1975), to mean 
that they have both discarded and/or repudiated these 
dubious concepts . For this latter reason we will not 
proceed to a formalization in a two-sector model where a 
lower rate of interest leads to investment in 'more capital­
istic' (or 'increasing the degree of mechanization') methods 
and thus to price dynamics leading to alteration in the 
distribution of income. Instead, we formalize the Lindahl 
model in the traditional Kaldor-Pasinetti framework which, 
though not incompatible with a two-sector formulation in a 1
1. There has been seme criticism, paradoxically by Joan Robinson herself, 
of the reswitching and capital reversal results - particularly, the 
former. Her point is that 'switches' require comparison in time or 
over space. However she seems to have overlooked the peculiar assum­
ption Sraffa (1960) made in § 93, in particular, pp. 82-84, to enable 
legitimate comparisons of two distinct systems. Sraffa, like Solow, 





























































































conventional way (cf. for example Ferguson's two-sector 
extension of the Kaldor model in Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 
317-322 and Rothschild, 1971), does not need that particular 
framework and still is able to encapsulate the essential 
features of Lindahl's assumptions - as we will try to show 
in the next section.
Before proceeding to a simple, algebraic, formalization 
it must be pointed out that the variations necessary in the 
distribution of income, in Lindahl's model to equate savings 
and investment, is primarily brought about by 'the rising 
prices caused by the lowered interest rate' (Lindahl, op. cit. 
p. 174) - and finds its exact parallel in the Kaldor-Pasinetti 
system in the variation of profit margins as pointed out by 
Kaldor in his rejoinder to Tobin (cf. Kaldor, 1959-60).
§ 3. A Simple Lindahlian Model : 






Y = Output (Income)
S = Total Savings
I = Total Investment
Sep = Savings Propensity of class E from Income P
scp = Savings Propensity of class C from Income P
slw = Savings Propensity of class L from Income W
S,IP = Savings Propensity of class L from Income P
1. The capitalists and entrepreneurs are 'transposed' fran Lindahl's 




























































































The following assumptions, in addition to those made in 
§ 2, are implicit (or explicit, in some cases) in Lindahl's 
discussion :
s s s } S-. y s, y o ...... (i)c p ' ep ' lpx lw
K and K. the part of the total e 1 *and, we denote by K 
stock of capital owned by the three classes respectively. 
Similarly, Pc , Pg and P.̂  denote the part of total profits 
accruing to the three classes. Thus, we have a three-class 
- two income closed economy, without a government, (produc­
ing two goods), in a stationary (or steady-state) equilibrium.
Total savings are givei
S = s P + sep e cp
and P + p + P = Pe c w
also Y = W + P
gives W = 1 ■- P
P Y




Then from simple substitution and the Savings-Investment 
Equality, in equilibrium, we get :
and
These collapse to Kaldor's or Pasinetti's systems when the 
appropriate assumptions are made.
Assuming that the rate of interest continues to be equal to 
the rate of profit and that the proportion of capital held 
by each class is identical with the proportion of total sav­



































































































K S K cp
These are, indeed, Pasinetti's celebrated results - and 
are implied by the Lindahl system. Thus, we can see, triv->- 
ially, that given the investment-income ratio the share of 
profits adjusts in such a way that savings are equated with 
investment. But the problem is that Lindahl does not assume 
an exogenously given investment-income ratio -• instead, 
investment is 'endogenized’ almost identifically to the 
Robinsonian model in Ferguson (op. cit.) § 15.3. For reasons 
that have been mentioned above we refrain from pursuing this 
path. To investigate the problem of the adjustment of 
savings to investment when the rate of interest is lowered, 
in relation to the rate of profit obtained by capitalists, 
we proceed, once more, along the lines suggested by Pasinetti
Denote by i , the rate of interest accruing to the entrepre­
neurs and workers. In equilibrium, then :
; P Pt = e = w (1 0 )
K Kw
where is the rate of interest.
This rate is lowered in relation to the rate of profit
obtained by capitalists on their capital, which is, of 
Pcourse, c .
Then following Pasinetti (1974)
i = ^ Pc where V K 1 
Kc
p. 140 ff, we can put : 










































































































Where, for the equilibrium growth at the natural rate, we 
get :
&where k : equilibrium capital-output ratio
gn : the equilibrium growth at the natural rate 
(Note : Lindahl assumes full employment, 
steady state).
and y = 1 when y = 1 or all savings propensities 
except s equal to zero.
and y y 1 when y<l and the savings propensities } 0.
Xj : the proportion of profit-earners in each 
category (the complement, in a sense, of 
Pasinetti's X{in f.n. 25, p. 142, Pasinetti, 
op. cit.).
Thus, it is clear that a rate of interest less than the 
rate of profit ( y(l) is equivalent to augmenting the savings 
propensity of the capitalists - or, what comes to the same 
thing, changing the distribution of income in favour of those 
with high savings propensities.
Although the distribution of income, between the share 
of profits as a whole and, therefore, the wage share, is 
determined given the investment-income ratio, the distribution 
of profits between classes is not. To determine this we proceed 
as follows :
In equilibrium (even when the autonomous rate of interest is 
less than the rate of profit), we must have :
Pw = w = s. W + s. lw lp w (15)
s P ep e
Then, w ’lw





























































































pw P= w . W jr *1.
Y W V [ (s )2- S.- ep lp -J v y >
Thus, from (12), (16) and (17) we can determine the distrib­
ution of income between Profits and Wages, on the one hand, 
and between workers and the rest ; however, the distribution 
of profit income between capitalists and entrepreneurs still 
remains to be determined. At equilibrium the proportion of 
capital owned should be equal to the proportion of savings, 









and using the result on the proportion of capital stock 
owned by each class which we have already done to determine 
y (cf. f.n. 25, p. 142 in Pasinetti -op.cit.-) we get :
Pe
K K




____ (2 1 )
where __e is a function of the parameters of the system.
K
Therefore, using (6), (7), (12), (16), (17) and (21) we
can determine the distribution of profits between classes.
From these results it is clear that the Lindahl model is 
conceptually richer than any of the classic Kaldor-Pasinetti 
models, but is very much in that tradition if we abstract 




























































































theoretic concepts. It is, of course, possible to proceed 
along the alternative modelling route of an explicit two- 
sector model and introducing a concept analogous to the 
Robinsonian (-Wicksellian) concept of a degree of mechan­
ization related (monotonously) to the notional rate of 
interest and its deviation from the even more dubious 
concept of a natural rate of profit. This latter concept 
was explicitly repudiated also by Lindahl.
§ 4. Concluding Notes :
The real richness of a Lindahlian model would be the 
next step : from an equilibrium (stationary or steady-state) 
within periods to the transition from one equilibrium to 
another. It is the problem of traverse - in Hicks's termin­
ology - or the problem of disequilibrium dynamics in the 
terminology of modern macrodynamics. The roots from which 
the problem of traverse and the problem of disequilibrium 
dynamics spring are, of course, related : Hicks's reformul­
ation, on the one hand, of Austrian capital theory, and, on 
the other hand, also in the hands of Hicks, the revitalization 
of the temporary equilibrium method of the Stockholm school 
- in particular Lindahl, Myrdal and Svennilsson. These, in 
turn, go back to the problem of a proper formulation of 
Social Accounting Relations (cf. Hicks, 1973 , in particular 
Chapter III, and Hicks, 1956).
Is the hint, then, that, if we are to go beyond steady 
state dynamics and attempt the difficult problems of disequi­
librium dynamics along the traverse the proper starting 
place is 'macropolitics' (Hicks, 1977), and Social Accounting 
via Public Finance - i.e., the dynamics of a Political 
Equilibrium. These are not too different from the reasons 
given by Kaldor, in his rejoinder to Tobin, for the method of 




























































































Though it is now customary to dismiss (as hand- 
waving) models in which accounting identities are manipulated 
to understand implicit dynamics, it is not without significance 
that the two most promising approaches to proper disequilibrium 
dynamics can be traced back to the works of the Swedes who 
never tired of seeking the fundamentals of dynamics and 
disequilibria in the balance-sheet of the macroeconomy.
Naturally, to remove the strait-jacket of steady-state 
dynamics, or Golden Age condition, we must introduce dynamics 
in the constituent functions. At this point we can proceed 
along conventional neo-classical lines (for eg. as in 
Stiglitz, 1967) or attempt a new approach along Neo-Keynesian 
or Neo-Cambridge lines. In the latter case the starting points 
would be one of the many Kaldorian growth models of the '50's 
and early '60's, or models of the Kalecki or Goodwin type. 
Nothing less than analysis in terms of Differential Games 
would be sufficient in this case and that is not a trivial 
task.
However, it is extremely significant that both Kaldor 
and Lindahl arrived at their interesting macro-economic 
theories of distribution from simple social accounting systems. 
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